We consider a general nonzero-sum impulse game with two players. The main mathematical contribution of the paper is a verification theorem which provides, under some regularity conditions, a suitable system of quasi-variational inequalities for the value functions and the optimal strategies of the two players. As an application, we study an impulse game with a one-dimensional state variable, following a real-valued scaled Brownian motion, and two players with linear and symmetric running payoffs. We fully characterize a Nash equilibrium and provide explicit expressions for the optimal strategies and the value functions. We also prove some asymptotic results with respect to the intervention costs. Finally, we consider two further non-symmetric examples where a Nash equilibrium is found numerically.
Introduction
In this article, we study a general two-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential game with impulse controls. In few words, after setting the general framework, we focus on the notion of Nash equilibrium and identify the corresponding system of quasi-variational inequalities (QVIs). As an application, we consider an impulse game with a one-dimensional state variable and fully solve the system of QVIs, obtaining explicit expressions for the value functions as well as the optimal strategies at equilibrium. This paper represents an extension of the results in the Ph.D. thesis [1] .
More specifically, we consider a game where two players can affect a continuous-time stochastic process X by discrete-time interventions which consist in shifting X to a new state. When none of the players intervenes, we assume X to diffuse according to a standard stochastic differential equation. Each intervention corresponds to a cost for the intervening player and a gain for the opponent. The strategy of player i ∈ {1, 2} is determined by a couple ϕ i = (A i , ξ i ), where A i is a fixed open subset and ξ i is a continuous function: namely, player i intervenes if and only if the process X exits from A i and, when this happens, she shifts the process from state x to state ξ i (x). Once the strategies ϕ i = (A i , ξ i ), i ∈ {1, 2}, and a starting point x have been chosen, a couple of impulse controls {(τ i,k , δ i,k )} k≥1 is uniquely defined: τ i,k is the k-th intervention time of player i and δ i,k is the corresponding impulse. Each player aims at maximizing her payoff, defined as follows: for every x belonging to some fixed subset S ⊆ R d and every couple of strategies (ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 ), we set where i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i = j and τ S is the exit time of X from S. The couple (ϕ The game just described is connected to the following system of QVIs:
where i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i = j and M i , H i are suitable intervention operators defined in Section 3.1.
The first contribution of our paper is the Verification Theorem 3.3: if two functions V i , with i ∈ {1, 2}, are a solution to (1.3), have polynomial growth and satisfy the regularity condition
where j ∈ {1, 2} with j = i and D j = {M j V j −V j < 0}, then they coincide with the value functions of the game and a characterization of the Nash strategy is possible. We stress that, even though stochastic differential games have been widely studied in the last decades, the case of nonzero-sum impulse games did not deserve so much attention so far and it has never been considered, to the best of our knowledge, from a QVI perspective. Indeed, related former works only address zero-sum stopping games [12] , the corresponding nonzero-sum problems [2] (with only two, very recent, explicit examples in [8] and [11] ) and zero-sum impulse games [9] . We notice that the system of QVIs proposed in [9] for zero-sum impulse games can be obtained as a particular case of our framework. In the field of stochastic differential games, it is also worth mentioning [10] , which provides a link between two-player nonzero-sum games of optimal stopping and two-player nonzero-sum games of singular control. Only the two papers [6, 7] deal with some nonzero-sum stochastic differential games with impulse controls and finite horizon using an approach based on backward stochastic differential equations and the maximum principle. Notice that in those two papers the sequence of stopping times along which impulses can be applied is given, hence the players can choose only the size of the impulses. In [6, 7] some examples are provided, where one Nash equilibrium is characterized in terms of solutions to suitable ordinary differential equations.
Our second contribution to this stream of research consists in providing examples of solvable impulse games. Using the Verification Theorem 3.3 described above and solving the system of QVIs (1.3), we are able to characterize one Nash equilibrium. The main example is described in Sections 4.1-4.4, where (1.3) is analytically solved and explicit formulas are provided. In Section 4.5 we consider further families of problems, where (1.3) is solved numerically. To our knowledge, these are the first examples of solvable nonzero-sum impulse games.
In Sections 4.1 we consider a two-player impulse game with a one-dimensional state variable X, modelled by a real-valued (scaled) Brownian motion. The two players have symmetric linear running payoffs and they can intervene on X by shifting it from its current state, say x, to some other state x + δ, with δ ∈ R. When a player intervenes, she faces a penalty while her opponent faces a gain, both consisting in a fixed and in a variable part, which is assumed proportional to the size of the impulse. Hence, the players objective functions are where {(τ i,k , δ i,k )} k≥1 denotes the impulse controls of player i associated to the strategies ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 . Some preliminary heuristics on the QVIs in (1.3) leads us to consider a pair of candidates for the functions V i . Then, a careful application of the verification theorem shows that such candidates actually coincide with the value functions of the game. In particular, a practical characterization of the Nash equilibria is possible: player 1 (resp. player 2) intervenes when the state X is smaller thanx 1 (resp. greater thanx 2 ) and moves the process to x
The outline of the paper is the following. In Section 2, we rigorously formulate the general impulse game and give the notions of admissible strategies and of Nash equilibrium. Section 3 provides the associated system of QVIs and the corresponding verification theorem. In Section 4 we analytically compute a Nash equilibrium for a one-dimensional impulse game and provide two further examples with numerical solutions. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
Nonzero-sum stochastic impulse games
In this section we introduce a general class of two-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential games with impulse controls.
Let (Ω, F, {F t } t≥0 , P) be a filtered probability space whose filtration satisfies the usual conditions of right-continuity and P-completeness, and let {W t } t≥0 be a k-dimensional {F t } t≥0 -adapted Brownian motion. For every t ≥ 0 and ζ ∈ L p (F t ) for some p > 1, we denote by
d×k are given functions. Throughout the whole paper, we assume that the coefficients b and σ are globally Lipschitz continuous, i.e. there exists a constant K > 0 such that for all y 1 , y 2 ∈ R d we have and let Z i be a fixed subset of R li , with l i ∈ N. Equation (2.1) models the underlying process when none of the players intervenes. If player i intervenes with some impulse δ ∈ Z i , the process is shifted from its current state x to a new state Γ i (x, δ), where Γ i : S × Z i → S is a given continuous function. Each intervention corresponds to a cost for the intervening player and to a gain for the opponent, both depending on the state x and the impulse δ.
The action of the players is modelled via discrete-time controls: an impulse control for player i is a sequence
where {τ i,k } k is a non-decreasing sequence of stopping times (the intervention times) and {δ i,k } k are Z i -valued F τ i,k -measurable random variables (the corresponding impulses). For the sake of tractability, we assume that the behaviour of the players, modelled by impulse controls, is driven by strategies, which are defined as follows. Definition 2.1. A strategy for player i ∈ {1, 2} is a pair ϕ i = (A i , ξ i ), where A i is a fixed open subset of S and ξ i is a continuous function from S to Z i .
Strategies determine the action of the players in the following sense. Let x ∈ S be an initial value for the state variable. Once some strategies ϕ i = (A i , ξ i ), i ∈ {1, 2}, have been chosen, a pair of impulse controls {(τ x;ϕ1,ϕ2 i,k , δ x;ϕ1,ϕ2 i,k )} k≥1 is uniquely defined by the following procedure:
-player i intervenes if and only if the process exits from A i , in which case the impulse is given by ξ i (y), where y is the state; -if both players want to act, player 1 has the priority; -the game ends when the process exits from S.
(2.2)
In the following definition we provide a rigorous formalization of the controls associated to a pair of strategies and the corresponding controlled process, which we denote by X x;ϕ1,ϕ2 . Moreover O denotes a generic subset of S and, finally, we adopt the conventions inf ∅ = ∞ and [∞, ∞[= ∅. Definition 2.2. Let x ∈ S and let ϕ i = (A i , ξ i ) be a strategy for player i ∈ {1, 2}. For k ∈ {0, . . . ,k}, wherek = sup{k ≥ 0 :
[starting point for the next step]
[contr. process up to the k-th interv.]
Letk i be the number of interventions by player i ∈ {1, 2} before the end of the game, and, in the case wherek i = 0, let η(i, k) be the index of her k-th intervention (1 ≤ k ≤k i ):
The controlled process {X x;ϕ1,ϕ2 s } s≥0 and the exit time τ
x;ϕ1,ϕ2 S are defined by
Finally, the impulse controls {(τ
When the context is clear and in order to shorten the notations, we will simply write X, τ S , τ i,k , δ i,k . Notice that player 1 has the priority in the case of simultaneous interventions (i.e., if α A1 k = α A2 k ). We also notice that, if player i intervenes a finite number of times (i.e.,k i is finite), then the tail of the control is conventionally set to (τ i,k , δ i,k ) = (τ S , 0), for k >k i . In the following lemma we give a rigorous formulation to the properties outlined in (2.2). Lemma 2.3. Let x ∈ S and let ϕ i = (A i , ξ i ) be a strategy for player i ∈ {1, 2}.
-The process X admits the following representation (with the convention [∞,∞[= ∅):
-The process X is right-continuous. More precisely, X is continuous and satisfies Equation
-The process X never exits from the set A 1 ∩ A 2 .
Proof. We just prove the first property in (2.5), the other ones being immediate. Let i ∈ {1, 2}, k ≥ 1 with τ i,k < τ S and set σ = η(i, k), with η as in Definition 2.2. By (2.3), (2.4) and Definition 2.2, we have
where in the fifth equality we have used the continuity of the process X σ−1 in [ τ σ−1 , ∞[ and in the next-to-last equality we exploited the fact that
Each player aims at maximizing her payoff, consisting of four discounted terms: a running payoff, the costs due to her interventions, the gains due to her opponent's interventions and a terminal payoff. More precisely, for each i ∈ {1, 2} we consider ρ i > 0 (the discount rate) and continuous functions f i : S → R (the running payoffs), h i : S → R (the terminal payoffs) and φ i : S × Z i → R, ψ i : S × Z j → R (the interventions' costs and gains), where j ∈ {1, 2} with j = i. The payoff of player i is defined as follows.
Definition 2.4. Let x ∈ S, let (ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 ) be a pair of strategies and let τ S be defined as in Definition 2.2. For each i ∈ {1, 2}, provided that the right-hand side exists and is finite, we set
where j ∈ {1, 2} with j = i and {(τ i,k , δ i,k )} k≥1 is the impulse control of player i associated to the strategies ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 .
As usual in control theory, the subscript in the expectation denotes conditioning with respect to the available information (hence, it recalls the starting point). Notice that in the summations above we do not consider stopping times which equal τ S (since the game ends in τ S , any intervention is meaningless).
In order for J i in (2.6) to be well defined, we now introduce the set of admissible strategies in x ∈ S. Definition 2.5. Let x ∈ S and ϕ i = (A i , ξ i ) be a strategy for player i ∈ {1,2}. We use the notations of Definition 2.2 and we say that the pair (ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 ) is x-admissible if:
1. for i ∈ {1, 2}, the following random variables are in L 1 (Ω):
2. for each p ∈ N, the random variable
We denote by A x the set of the x-admissible pairs.
Thanks to the first condition in Definition 2.5, the payoffs J i (x; ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 ) are well-defined. The second condition will be used in the proof of the Verification Theorem 3.3. As for the third and the fourth conditions, they prevent each player to exercise twice at the same time and to accumulate the interventions before τ S .
We conclude the section with the definition of Nash equilibrium and the corresponding value functions in our setting. Definition 2.6. Given x ∈ S, we say that (ϕ *
Finally, the value functions of the game are defined as follows: if x ∈ S and a Nash equilibrium (ϕ * 1 , ϕ * 2 ) ∈ A x exists, we set for i ∈ {1, 2}
A verification theorem
In this section we define a suitable differential problem for the value functions of nonzero-sum impulse games (see Section 3.1) and prove a verification theorem for such games (see Section 3.2).
The quasi-variational inequality problem
We now introduce the differential problem that should be satisfied by the value functions of our games: this will be key for stating the verification theorem in the next section. Let us consider an impulse game as in Section 2. Assume that the corresponding value functions V 1 , V 2 are defined for each x ∈ S and that for i ∈ {1, 2} there exists a (unique) function δ i from S to Z i such that
for each x ∈ S. We define the four intervention operators by
2) for x ∈ S and i, j ∈ {1, 2}, with i = j. Notice that
The functions in (3.1) and (3.2) have an immediate and intuitive interpretation. Let x be the current state of the process; if player i (resp. player j) intervenes with impulse δ, the present value of the game for player i can be written as
we have considered the value in the new state and the intervention cost (resp. gain). Hence, δ i (x) in (3.1) is the impulse that player i would use in case she wants to intervene.
) represents the value of the game for player i when player i (resp. player j = i) takes the best immediate action and behaves optimally afterwards. Notice that it is not always optimal to intervene, so M i V i (x) ≤ V i (x), for each x ∈ S, and that player i should intervene (with impulse δ i (x)) only if M i V i (x) = V i (x). This gives a heuristic formulation of Nash equilibria, provided that an explicit expression for V i is available. The verification theorem will give a rigorous proof to this heuristic argument. We now characterize the value functions V i .
Assume V 1 , V 2 ∈ C 2 (S) (weaker conditions will be given later) and define
where b, σ are as in (2.1), σ t denotes the transpose of σ and ∇V i , D 2 V i are the gradient and the Hessian matrix of V i , respectively. We are interested in the following quasi-variational inequalities (QVIs) for V 1 , V 2 , where i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i = j:
Notice that there is a small abuse of notation in (3.3a), as V i is not defined in ∂S, so that (3.3a) means lim y→x V i (y) = h i (x), for each x ∈ ∂S. We now provide some intuition behind conditions (3.3a)-(3.3d). First of all, the terminal condition is obvious. Moreover, as we already noticed, (3.3b) is a standard condition in impulse control theory. For (3.3c), if player j intervenes (i.e., M j V j − V j = 0), by the definition of Nash equilibrium we expect that player i does not lose anything: this is equivalent to H i V i − V i = 0, otherwise it would be in her interest to deviate. On the contrary, if player j does not intervene (hence M j V j − V j < 0), then the problem for player i becomes a classical one-player impulse control one,
In short, the latter condition says
Remark 3.1. We notice that AV i only appears in {M j V j − V j < 0}, so that V i needs to be of class C 2 only in such a region (indeed, this assumption can be slightly relaxed, as we will see). This represents a difference to the one-player case, where the value function is usually required to be twice differentiable almost everywhere in S, see [15, Thm. 6 
.2].
The zero-sum case. A verification theorem will be provided in the next section. Here, as a preliminary check, we show that we are indeed generalizing the system of QVIs provided in [9] , where the zero-sum case is considered. We show that, if we assume
so that V := V 1 = −V 2 , then the problem in (3.3) reduces to the one considered in [9] . To shorten the equations, we assume ρ 1 = ρ 2 = 0 (this makes sense since in [9] a finite-horizon problem is considered). First of all, we define
for each x ∈ S. It is easy to see that, under the conditions in (3.4), we have
By using (3.5), problem (3.3) becomes
Simple computations, reported below, show that problem (3.6) is equivalent to
which is exactly the problem studied in [9] , as anticipated. We conclude this section by proving the equivalence of (3.6) and (3.7).
Lemma 3.2. Problems (3.6) and (3.7) are equivalent.
Proof.
Step 1. We prove that (3.6) implies (3.7). The only property to be proved is (3.7c). We consider three cases. First, assume V = MV . Since AV +f ≤ 0 and MV −V = 0, we have max{AV +f, MV −V } = 0, which implies (3.7c) since HV − V ≥ 0. Then, assume MV < V < HV . Since AV + f = 0 and MV −V < 0, we have max{AV +f, MV −V } = 0, which implies (3.7c) since HV −V > 0. Finally, assume V = HV . Since AV + f ≥ 0 and MV − V ≤ 0, we have max{AV + f, MV − V } ≥ 0, which implies (3.7c) since HV − V = 0.
Step 2. We show that (3.7) implies (3.6). The only properties to be proved are (3.6c), (3.6d) and (3.6e). We assume MV < HV (the case MV = HV being immediate) and consider three cases.
First, assume V = MV . Since HV − V > 0, from (3.7c) it follows that max{AV + f, 0} = 0, which implies AV + f ≤ 0. Then, assume MV < V < HV . Since min{max{α, β}, γ} ∈ {α, β, γ} for every α, β, γ ∈ R, and since MV − V < 0 < HV − V , from (3.7c) it follows that AV + f = 0. Finally, assume V = HV . From (3.7c) it follows that max{AV + f, MV − V } ≥ 0, which implies AV + f ≥ 0 since MV − V < 0.
Statement and proof
We provide here the main mathematical contribution of this paper, which is a verification theorem for the problems formalized in Section 2.
Theorem 3.3 (Verification theorem)
. Let all the notations and working assumptions in Section 2 be in force and let V i be a function from S to R, with i ∈ {1, 2}. Assume that (3.1) holds and set
and it has polynomial growth;
-∂D i is a Lipschitz surface 1 , and V i has locally bounded derivatives up to the second order in some neighbourhood of ∂D i .
Finally, let x ∈ S and assume that (ϕ * 1 , ϕ * 2 ) ∈ A x , with
where i ∈ {1, 2}, the set D i is as above and the function δ i is as in (3.1). Then,
Remark 3.4. Practically, the Nash strategy is characterized as follows: player i intervenes only if the controlled process exits from the region
where x is the current state). When this happens, her impulse is δ i (x).
Remark 3.5. We notice that, for the (candidate) optimal strategies in the theorem above, the properties in Lemma 2.3 imply what follows (the notation is heavy, but it will be crucial to understand the proof of the theorem):
for every strategies ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 such that (ϕ 1 , ϕ * 2 ), (ϕ * 1 , ϕ 2 ) ∈ A x , every s ≥ 0 and every τ
Proof. By Definition 2.6, we have to prove that
, for every i ∈ {1, 2} and (ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 ) strategies such that (ϕ 1 , ϕ * 2 ) ∈ A x and (ϕ * 1 , ϕ 2 ) ∈ A x . We show the results for V 1 and J 1 , the arguments for V 2 and J 2 being symmetric.
. Let ϕ 1 be a strategy for player 1 such that (ϕ 1 , ϕ * 2 ) ∈ A x . Here we will use the following shortened notation:
Thanks to the regularity assumptions and by standard approximation arguments, it is not restrictive to assume
. For each r > 0 and n ∈ N, we set
where τ r = inf{s > 0 : X s / ∈ B(0, r)} is the exit time from the ball with radius r. We apply Itô's formula to the process e −ρ1t V 1 (X t ) over the interval [0, τ r,n ] and take the conditional expectations (the initial point and the stochastic integral are in L 1 (Ω), so that the other terms are in L 1 (Ω) too by equality): we get
We now estimate each term in the right-hand side of (3.9). As for the first term, since (M 2 V 2 − V 2 )(X s ) < 0 by (3.8b), from (3.3d) it follows that
Let us now consider the second term: by (3.3b) and the definition of M 1 V 1 in (3.2), for every stopping time τ 1,k < τ S we have
As for the third term, let us consider any stopping time τ 2,k < τ S . By (3.8f) we have (M 2 V 2 − V 2 ) X (τ 2,k ) − = 0; hence, the condition in (3.3c), the definition of H 1 V 1 in (3.2) and the expression of δ 2,k in (3.8d) imply that
By (3.9) and the estimates in (3.10)-(3.12) it follows that
Thanks to the conditions in (2.7), (2.8) and the polynomial growth of V 1 , we can use the dominated convergence theorem and pass to the limit, first as r → ∞ and then as n → ∞. In particular, for the fourth term we notice that
for suitable constants C > 0 and p ∈ N; the corresponding limit immediately follows by the continuity of V 1 in the case τ S < ∞ and by (3.13) itself in the case τ S = ∞ (as a direct consequence of (2.8), we have X p ∞ < ∞ a.s.). Hence, we finally get
Step 2:
. We argue as in Step 1, but here all the inequalities are equalities by the properties of ϕ * 1 .
As already noticed in Remark 3.1, we stress that, unlike one-player impulse control problems, in our verification theorem the candidates are not required to be twice differentiable everywhere. For example, consider the case of player 1: as in the proof we always consider pairs of strategies in the form (ϕ 1 , ϕ * 2 ), by (3.8b) the controlled process never exits from D 2 = {M 2 V 2 − V 2 < 0}, which is then the only region where the function V 1 needs to be (almost everywhere) twice differentiable in order to apply Itô's formula.
We conclude this section with some considerations on how the theorem above will typically be used. First, when solving the system of QVIs, one deals with functions which are defined only piecewise, as it will be clear in the next section. Then, the regularity assumptions in the verification theorem will give us suitable pasting conditions, leading to a system of algebraic equations. If the regularity conditions are too strong, the system has more equations than parameters, making the application of the theorem more difficult. Hence, a crucial point when stating a verification theorem is to set regularity conditions giving a solvable system of equations. In Section 4 we show that, in an example of one-dimensional impulse game, the regularity conditions actually lead to a well-posed algebraic system having a unique solution.
Examples of solvable one-dimensional impulse games
In Sections 4.1-4.4 we provide an application of the Verification Theorem 3.3 to an impulse game with a one-dimensional state variable modelled by a (scaled) Brownian motion, that can be shifted due to the interventions of two players with linear payoffs. We find a Nash equilibrium for such a game and provide explicit expressions for the value functions and for the optimal strategies at equilibrium. In Section 4.5 we adapt the solving procedure to two further families of examples, with cubic payoffs and with linear and cubic payoffs, where a solution is found numerically.
Formulation of the problem
We consider a one-dimensional real process X and two players with opposite goals: player 1 prefers a high value for the process X, whereas the goal of player 2 is to force X to take a low value. More precisely, if x denotes the current value of the process, we assume that the running payoffs of the two players are given by
where s 1 , s 2 are fixed (possibly negative) constants. We assume that each player can intervene and shift X from state x to state x + δ, with δ ∈ R. Moreover, when none of the players intervenes, we assume that X follows a (scaled) Brownian motion. Hence, if x denotes the initial state and u i = {(τ i,k , δ i,k )} k≥1 collects the intervention times and the corresponding impulses of player i ∈ {1, 2}, we have
where W is a standard one-dimensional Brownian motion and σ > 0 is a fixed parameter. As player 2 aims at lowering the level, we can assume that her impulses are negative: δ 2,k < 0, for every k ∈ N. Similarly, we assume δ 1,k > 0, for every k ∈ N. Affecting the process has a cost for the intervening player and we also assume that there is a corresponding gain for the opponent. In our model both intervention penalties and gains consist in a fixed cost and in a variable cost, assumed to be proportional to the absolute value of the impulse: if φ i denotes the intervention penalty for player i and ψ j denotes the corresponding gain for player j, we assume
where δ ∈ R is the impulse corresponding to the intervention of player i and c,c, λ,λ are fixed constants such that c ≥c ≥ 0,
The order conditions have this justification: if we had c <c or λ <λ, then, for a suitable impulse δ, the two players could realize a mutual gain by an (almost) instantaneous double intervention; by iterating this infinitely often in a finite interval, the two value functions would diverge (this phenomenon is analogous to the one already present in [11] for stopping games). The condition (c, λ) = (c,λ) will be explained in Remark 4.5 and Section 4.4. Finally, we assume
where ρ is the discount rate, the same one for both the players. This problem clearly belongs to the class described in Section 2, with
and with f i , φ i , ψ i as above. In short, if ϕ i = (A i , ξ i ) denotes the strategy of player i, the objective functions are
where {(τ i,k , δ i,k )} k≥1 denotes the impulse controls of player i associated to the strategies ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 . As already outlined, the players have different goals: we are going to investigate if a Nash equilibrium for such a problem exists. Indeed, since s 1 < s 2 both the players gain in the interval [s 1 , s 2 ], it seems that there is room for a Nash configuration. If a Nash equilibrium exists, we denote by V 1 (x), V 2 (x) the corresponding value of the game with initial state x ∈ R.
Interpretations. We provide two possible interpretations of the game just described.
First, let X denote the exchange rate between two currencies. The central banks of the corresponding countries (the players) have different targets for the rate: player 1 prefers a high value for X, while the goal of player 2 is yielding a low value. To have a tractable model, it is reasonable to assume that the payoffs of the two players are given, respectively, by X − s 1 and s 2 − X, where s 1 , s 2 are fixed constants with s 2 > s 1 , which leads to the one-dimensional game defined in this section. This interpretation (detailed in [1, Sect. 3.3] ) corresponds to a two-player version of the model introduced and studied in, e.g., [4] and [5] .
The second possible interpretation is related to energy markets. Let the process X model the forward price of energy. Player 1 is an energy producer and s 1 is the unitary production cost, so that, in a simplified model, her payoff is X − s 1 . On the other hand, player 2 runs a company, which buys energy at price X and sells her products at some price s 2 , with s 2 > s 1 , so that her payoff is s 2 − X. Since player 2 consumes a high volume of energy, she can be considered as a big market player; so, both the players affect the price of energy, and we get the nonzero-sum impulse game studied in this section (both the players have enough impact on the economy to obtain a financial compensation from the state to mitigate sudden adverse movements of the forward price).
Looking for candidates for the value functions
Our goal is to use the Verification Theorem 3.3. We start by looking for a solution to the problem in (3.3), in order to get a couple of candidatesṼ 1 ,Ṽ 2 for the value functions V 1 , V 2 .
First, consider the two equations in the QVI problem (3.3) , that is
for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, with i = j; this suggests the following representation forṼ i : for i ∈ {1, 2} and x ∈ R, where ϕ i is a solution to
Notice that an explicit formula for ϕ i is available: for each x ∈ R, we have
where A ij are real parameters and the parameter θ is defined by
In order to go on, we need to guess an expression for the intervention regions. As the goal of player 1 is to keep a high value for the process, it is reasonable to assume that her intervention region is in the form ] − ∞,x 1 ], for some thresholdx 1 . For a similar reason, we expect the intervention region of player 2 to be in the form [x 2 , +∞[, for some other thresholdx 2 . Since s 1 < s 2 , we guess thatx 1 <x 2 ; as a consequence, the real line is heuristically partitioned into three intervals: By the representation (4.3), this leads to the following expressions forṼ 1 andṼ 2 :
Let us now investigate the form of M iṼi and H iṼi . Recall that the impulses of player 1 (resp. player 2) are positive (resp. negative); then, we have
It is reasonable to assume that the maximum point of the function y →Ṽ 1 (y) − λy (resp. y → V 2 (y) + λy) exists, is unique and belongs to the common continuation region ]x 1 ,x 2 [, where we haveṼ 1 = ϕ 1 (resp.Ṽ 2 = ϕ 2 ). As a consequence, if we denote by x * i , i ∈ {1, 2}, such maximum points, that is
the functions M iṼi , H iṼi have the following (heuristic, at the moment) expression:
As for the parameters involved inṼ 1 ,Ṽ 2 , they must be chosen so as to satisfy the regularity assumptions in the verification theorem, which here writẽ
, +∞[, we have to set the parameters so thatṼ i is continuous atx 1 ,x 2 and differentiable atx i (we underline thatṼ 1 andṼ 2 might not be differentiable at, respectively,x 2 andx 1 ). Finally, to summarize all the previous arguments, our candidates for the value functions are defined as follows.
Definition 4.1. For every x ∈ R, we set 2 ) satisfy the order conditionsx
7)
and the following conditions:
In order to have a well-posed definition, we need to show that the conditions in (4.7)-(4.8)-(4.9) actually admit a unique solution. 
Proof.
We just focus on the existence of solutions: uniqueness will immediately follow from Proposition 4.7 in the next section (different solutions would imply different expressions for the value functions).
First, we reduce the number of equations. Notice that the running costs f i are symmetric with respect tos := (s 1 + s 2 )/2; we guess that the couples (x 1 ,x 2 ), (x * 1 , x * 2 ) and (ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 ) have the same property, that is and by plugging (4.9a)-(4.9b) into (4.9c)-(4.9d), reads (we set η = (1 − λρ)/ρ, notice that η > 0)
Also recall the order condition (4.7), which now reads 1 <ȳy * <ȳ 2 . (4.13)
We now prove that there exists a unique solution (A 1 , A 2 ,ȳ, y * ) to (4.12)-(4.13). Given a fixed pair (A 1 , A 2 ) ∈ A, where
there exists a unique solution to (4.12a)-(4.12b), given bȳ
To conclude, we just need to prove that there exists a unique pair (A 1 , A 2 ) such that
is a solution to (4.12c)-(4.12d)-(4.13), (4.15) that is, by the expressions in (4.14), such that
For x ∈ (0, η), define the function
Since F (0 + ) = θc > 0, F (η − ) = −∞ and F < 0, there exists a unique ξ ∈ (0, η) such that F (ξ) = 0, so that we can rewrite (4.16b) as η 2 + A 1 A 2 = ξ. Consequently, (4.16) is equivalent to
18) which trivially has a unique solution (notice that N 2 + M > 0), namely
Finally, it is immediate to see that ϕ 2 < 0 in ] − ∞,x[ and ϕ 2 > 0 in ]x, +∞[, for a suitablẽ x ∈ R. By the change of variable, ϕ 2 (x 2 ) > 0 (resp. ϕ 2 (x * 2 ) < 0) if and only if A 1ȳ − η > 0 (resp. A 1 y * − η < 0), which is trivially true; hence,x ∈]x * 2 ,x 2 [. . In particular, we notice that the other solution of (4.9) is, in the new variables of the proofs, for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, where ξ = ξ(c, θ, η) ∈ (0, η) is the unique zero of the function F in (4.17) and the coefficients are defined bỹ
Also, notice that (4.10) implies thatṼ 1 (x) =Ṽ 2 (2s − x), for x ∈ R, i.e. the functionsṼ i are symmetric with respect tos. 
Application of the verification theorem
We now apply the Verification Theorem 3.3 and prove that the candidatesṼ 1 ,Ṽ 2 in Definition 4.1 actually coincide with the value functions V 1 , V 2 of the problem described in Section 4.1. We refer the reader to Section 3.1 for the definition of the functions δ 1 , δ 2 , M 1 , M 2 used in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.6. LetṼ 1 ,Ṽ 2 be as in Definition 4.1. For every x ∈ R we have Moreover, we have
Proof. We give the proof only for δ 2 and M 2Ṽ2 , the arguments for δ 1 and M 1Ṽ1 being the same.
For every x ∈ R, we have where for each y ∈ R we have set Γ 2 (y) =Ṽ 2 (y) + λy.
By the definition ofṼ 2 , we have Γ 2 (x * 2 ) = Γ 2 (x 2 ) = 0. Moreover, we notice that: As a consequence, the function Γ 2 has a unique global maximum point in x * 2 , so that
therefore, by the computations in (4.24), we have
. By the definition ofṼ 2 , this can be written as
where, for each x ∈] − ∞,x 2 [, we have set
2 ,x 2 [. Hence, ξ 2 is strictly positive, so that (4.23) holds. Finally, by the previous arguments it is clear that arg max 
with y ∈ R and x * i ,x i (i ∈ {1, 2}) as in Definition 4.1. Moreover, the functionsṼ 1 ,Ṽ 2 in Definition 4.1 coincide with the value functions V 1 , V 2 :
Remark 4.8. Recall the practical characterization of the strategy: if x is the current state of the process, player 1 (resp. player 2) intervenes when x ≤x 1 (resp. x ≥x 2 ) and moves the process to the new state x * 1 (resp. x * 2 ).
Proof. We have to check that the candidatesṼ 1 ,Ṽ 2 satisfy all the assumptions of Theorem 3.3. We prove the claim forṼ 2 , the arguments forṼ 1 being the same. For the reader's convenience, we briefly report the conditions we have to check:
and has polynomial growth;
(v) the optimal strategies are x-admissible (see Definition 2.5) for every x ∈ R.
Condition (i) and (ii).
The first condition holds by the definition ofṼ 2 , whereas the second condition has been proved in (4.23).
Condition
, by (4.22) and by the definition ofṼ 2 we have
where we have used thatṼ 2 
In ]x 1 ,x 2 [ the claim is true, as M 2Ṽ2 −Ṽ 2 < 0 by (4.23) and AṼ 2 − ρṼ 2 + f 2 = 0 by definition (in ]x 1 ,x 2 [ we haveṼ 2 = ϕ 2 , which is a solution to the ODE). In [x 2 , ∞[ we already know by (4.23) that M 2Ṽ2 −Ṽ 2 = 0. Then, to conclude we have to check that
2 ) by the definition ofṼ 2 (x), the inequality can be written as
2 ) by (4.9), we can rewrite the claim as
The function x → λρx + f 2 (x) = (λρ − 1)x + s 2 is decreasing, hence it is enough to prove the claim in x =x 2 :
Since Aϕ 2 (x 2 ) − ρϕ 2 (x 2 ) + f 2 (x 2 ) = 0, we can rewrite as v) . Let x be the initial state of the process. By construction the controlled process never exits from ]x 1 ,x 2 [ ∪ {x}, so that condition (2.8) holds. It is easy to check that all the other conditions of Definition 2.5 are satisfied. The only non-trivial proof is the integrability of the intervention costs: let us prove that for i ∈ {1, 2} we have (the result forc,λ immediately follows, asλ < λ andc < c)
where {τ * i,k , δ * i,k } k are the controls corresponding to the optimal strategies. To start, let us assume that the initial state x is either x * 1 or x * 2 . We here consider x = x * 1 , the arguments are the same in the case x = x * 2 . Since player i shifts the process to x * i when the statex i is hit, the idea is to write τ * i,k as a sum of independent exit times. First of all, we re-label the indexes and write {τ * i,k } i,k as {σ j } j , with σ j < σ j+1 for every j ∈ N (this is possible: see Definition 2.2). Denote by µ i the exit time of the process x * i + σW from ]x 1 ,x 2 [, where W is a real Brownian motion; then, each time σ j can be written as σ j = j l=1 ζ l , where the ζ l are independent variables which are distributed either as µ 1 or as µ 2 . We can now estimate (4.25). As
By the definition of {σ j } j and the decomposition of σ j ,
By the Fubini-Tonelli theorem and the independence of the variables ζ j , we get
which is a converging geometric series, since µ 1 , µ 2 ≥ 0. To sum up, we have shown
which clearly implies (4.25). The general case with initial state x ∈ R can be treated similarly: we have σ j = η + j l=1 ζ l , where η is the exit time of x + σW from [x 1 ,x 2 ], and the argument can be easily adapted.
Comments and some limit properties
In order to understand the qualitative behaviour of the Nash equilibrium described in the previous section, we here study some asymptotic properties of the corresponding continuation regions and value functions. First, we recall some formulas from the previous sections, for reader's convenience. The value functions of the game are (4.26) where the function ϕ A21,A22 2 is defined in (4.5) and the parametersx i , x * i , A ij are defined in (4.20) . In particular, we recall the symmetry relations:
withs as in (4.21). Also, recall that player 1 (resp. player 2) intervenes if the state is smaller than x 1 (resp. greater thanx 2 ) and moves the process to x * 1 (resp. x * 2 ). Finally we remark that the parameter ξ = ξ(c, θ, η), defined as the unique zero of the function F in (4.17), satisfies the following properties: for given parameters θ and η, the function c → ξ(c, θ, η) =: ξ(c) belongs to C ∞ (]0, ∞[) and we have Limits as c → 0 + . Since we are going to consider the limit c → 0 + and since by assumption we need c >c, withc fixed, we assumec = 0. If the fixed intervention cost vanishes, that is c → 0 + , we expect that the players continuously intervene to keep the process in a state which satisfies both of them (namelys, for symmetry reasons): in other words, we expect the continuation region ]x 1 (c),x 2 (c)[ to collapse to the singleton {s}, as c → 0 + . Practically, if the initially state is x, either player 1 (if x <s) or player 2 (if x >s) shifts the process tos; from then on, we constantly have X s ≡s. As a consequence, we guess that the value function for player 2 is
We now rigorously prove these heuristic arguments by considering the explicit expression for the intervention region provided in (4.20). Actually, the limit situation is not as straightforward as it may appear: the parameters λ,λ play an important role.
Proposition 4.9. Assumec = 0 and λ =λ. Then we have, for i ∈ {1, 2} and x ∈ R
Proof. By (4.20) and (4.28) it follows thatx 2 (c) →s as c → 0 + . The same result holds forx 1 by symmetry and hence also for x * i , since x * i ∈]x 1 ,x 2 [. Moreover, again by (4.20) and (4.28), we get
hence, by the first part of the proof, for each x ∈ R we have (recall that λ =λ)
The corresponding result for V 1 follows by symmetry.
Limits as c → +∞. If the intervention cost increases, the players rarely intervene. In the limit case c → +∞, they never intervene and we expect ]x 1 (c),x 2 (c)[ to coincide with R. Correspondingly, the state variable diffuses without being affected by the players, that is X s = x + σW s , for each s ≥ 0. As a consequence, we guess that the value function for player 2 is
Moreover, the intervening player clearly compensates the cost c + λ|x * i − x| by moving the process to a state where her payoff is bigger than the opponent's one. In the case c → +∞, the intervening player has to compensate diverging costs, so that we guess that x * i (c) diverges too. We now rigorously prove our guesses. Proposition 4.10. The following limits hold:
Proof. By ( hence, by the first part of this proof, for each x ∈ R we have
Monotonicity ofx i , x * i . If the intervention cost c increases, we expect the common continuation region ]x 1 (c),x 2 (c)[ to enlarge, since the players are less willing to intervene. Proposition 4.11 makes this guess rigorous. 
is an increasing function. Since ξ > 0, a sufficient condition is that
which is true since by (4.28) we have H(c + ) = 0 (consider separately the casesc = 0 andc > 0) and H (c) > 0. The result forx 1 (c) follows by symmetry.
As for the monotonicity of x * i , it is not easy to make a guess. The formulas in (4.20) does not allow easy estimates; however, a monotonicity result can be proved in the casec = 0. We will see later by some numerical simulations that in the general case the function x * i is not monotone. 
is decreasing, that is Limits as c →c + . We conclude this section with the behaviour as c →c + in the case λ =λ, i.e. when each intervention practically becomes a transfer of money from the intervening player to the opponent. It is not easy to guess what happens in this case and the result is quite surprising: the limiting strategies are not admissible. Proposition 4.13. Assume λ =λ. For i, j ∈ {1, 2} with i = j, the following limits hold:
Proof. The result immediately follows by (4.20) and (4.28).
Essentially, the limit situation is as follows. Let i, j ∈ {1, 2} with i = j; as soon as the process reachesx i , player i moves the process to x * i =x j , which is the boundary of the intervention region of player j, who moves the process back tox i , thus causing another intervention by player i and so on. We get a infinite sequence of simultaneous interventions, meaning that these strategies are not admissible.
Numerical simulations. Here, we present the results (obtained with Wolfram Mathematica) of some numerical simulations on the game we have described. We focus on player 2 and consider the following two sets of parameters: 2 (x) for Problem 2 and c = 100. In both the cases, we notice the C 1 -pasting inx 1 , whereas, as noticed in Section 2, the functions are not differentiable inx 1 . Also, when λ is non-zero, the function is unbounded. As proved above, the continuation region enlarges as c grows and diverges as c → ∞. Consider the limit case c →c + : ifc = 0, the four parameters converge to the same states; conversely, in the casec > 0, we see that x * 1 (resp. x * 2 ) converges tox 2 (resp.x 1 ), which corresponds to an inadmissible game. Also, we notice that x * 1 (resp. x * 2 ) is decreasing (resp. increasing) whenc = 0, whereas such functions are not monotone in thec > 0 case.
We finally consider Problem 1 and the evolution of x → V + , then a bell-shaped curve appears; as c grows, the local maximum moves to the left and the right side of the bell resembles more and more a straight line with slope 1/ρ, which is actually the limit as c → +∞. 
Further examples
The arguments in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 can be easily adapted to other problems: we here provide some further examples. Clearly, in most cases one has to deal with the full 8-equation system (4.7)-(4.8)-(4.9) (the decoupling technique in Proposition 4.2 is only possible with symmetric payoffs) and the solution has to be found numerically.
Cubic payoffs. Let us consider the same setting as in Section 4.1, now with cubic payoffs: namely, we substitute (4.1) with f 1 (x) = c 1 (x − s 1 ) 3 ,f 2 (x) = (s 2 − x) 3 , s 1 < s 2 , for x ∈ R, where c 1 is a strictly positive constant. To find an expression for the Nash equilibrium, we follow the procedure introduced in the previous sections, as follows. First, we solve (4.4), with f i substituted byf i : for x ∈ R, the solutions are given bỹ Then, by the same arguments as in Section 4.2, a pair of (candidate) value functions is given by (4.6), with ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 substituted byφ 1 ,φ 2 . In order to have a well-posed definition, we have to find a solution (A ij ,x i , x * i ) i,j∈{1,2} to the 8-equation system (4.7)-(4.8)-(4.9). If c 1 = 1, we can apply the symmetry argument in the proof of Proposition 4.2 and consider a reduced system with four equations. In general, however, we need to deal with the full 8-equation system. In both cases, the solution has to be found numerically. Finally, given a solution to (4.7)-(4.8)-(4.9), we have to verify that the candidates actually satisfy all the assumptions of the Verification Theorem 3.3. We proceed as in Section 4.3: the only difference occurs when verifying that Indeed, here we cannot use the monotonicity argument in the proof of Proposition 4.7, so that (4.29) has to be checked numerically. Provided that (4.29) holds, we can then conclude that a Nash equilibrium exists: player 1 (resp. player 2) intervenes when the state variable exits from ]x 1 , +∞[ (resp. ] − ∞,x 2 [) and shifts the process to x * 1 (resp. x * 2 ). As an example, we consider the following values: Notice that the continuation region ]x 1 ,x 2 [ is closer to s 1 than to s 2 , which is reasonable: since c 1 > 1, player 1 experiences higher gains and losses if compared to player 2, so that she is more willing to intervene than her opponent, which practically translates into |x 1 − s 1 | < |x 2 − s 2 |.
Linear and cubic payoffs. Let us consider the same setting as in Section 4.1, but now player 1 has a cubic payoff and player 2 has a linear payoff: namely, we substitute (4.1) witĥ f 1 (x) = c 1 (x − s 1 ) 3 ,f 2 (x) = s 2 − x, s 1 < s 2 , for x ∈ R, where c 1 is a strictly positive constant. As above, a pair of candidate value functions is given by (4.6), with ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 substituted bŷ For the same reasons as above, we remark that ]x 1 ,x 2 [ is closer to s 1 than to s 2 .
Remark 4.14. For the sake of simplicity, in this section we have kept the same dynamics as in the previous section, when none of the players intervenes, that is dX s = σdW s . However, different equations could be considered, as this would only affect the definition of the coefficient θ in ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 .
Conclusions
In this paper, we have considered a general two-player nonzero-sum impulse game, whose state variable follows a diffusive dynamics driven by a multi-dimensional Brownian motion. After setting the problem, we have provided a verification theorem giving sufficient conditions in order for the solutions of a suitable system of quasi-variational inequalities to coincide with the value functions of the two players. To the best of our knowledge this result is new to the literature on impulse games and it constitutes the major mathematical contribution of the present paper. As an application, we have provided a solvable one-dimensional impulse game where two players with linear running payoffs can shift a real-valued Brownian motion in order to maximize their objective functions. We have found a Nash equilibrium and explicitly characterized the corresponding optimal strategies. We have also studied some asymptotic properties of such a Nash equilibrium.
As a final contribution, we have considered two further families of examples, with cubic payoffs and with linear and cubic payoffs, where a solution is found numerically.
